Volume 16, Issue 3, July 1999
Might-Counterfactuals, Transworld Untrustworthiness and Plantinga’s Free Will Defence
Plantinga’s Free Will Defense (FWD) employs the following proposition as a premise:
◊TD. Possibly, every essence is transworld depraved.
I argue that he fails to establish his intended conclusion because the denial of ◊TD is epistemically possible. I then consider an improved version of the FWD which relies on
◊TU. Possibly, every essence is transworld untrustworthy.
(The notion of transworld untrustworthiness is the might-counterfactual counterpart to Plantinga’s would-counterfactual notion of transworld depravity.) I argue that the denial of ◊TU is also epistemically possible and, therefore, that the improved FWD fares no better than the original at establishing the compatibility of God and evil.